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Lotte Huniche
Studying Genetic Risk in the 
Conduct of Everyday Life
Summary
This article is a revised version of a talk given in lieu 
of the Ph.D. dissertation: Huntington’s Disease in 
Everyday Life. Knowledge, Ignorance and Genetic 
Risk (Huniche 2002). The dissertation evolves around 
the analysis of modern living with risk for a late onset 
genetic disorder. Here, three aspects of everyday lives 
faced with Huntington’s Disease (HD) are discussed. 
First, HD is one aspect of everyday living along with 
a variety of other aspects. The importance of risk is 
analysed as personal and changing in changing circum-
stances. Second, genetic knowledge and technology are 
not solid universals, but situated and changing, and of 
varying importance in lives at risk. Last, the ethical 
rationalities of everyday living, research and clinical 
practice concerned with a hereditary condition are 
discussed as complex and contradictory in and across 
structures of social practice.
Introduction
In this paper I address three main dimensions 
of the empirical study resulting in the submis-
sion of the Ph.D. dissertation: Huntington’s 
Disease in Everyday Life: Knowledge, Igno-
rance and Genetic Risk (Huniche 2002).
The disease of the gene
Huntington’s Disease (HD) is a severe neuro-
logical disorder named after the medical doc-
tor, George Huntington (1850-1916), who fi rst 
described its symptoms and pattern of inher-
itance (Huntington 1872). Symptoms consist 
of involuntary movements, loss of motor con-
trol and balance. HD affects cognitive abilities 
like problem solving, judgment, planning and 
carrying out everyday tasks. Furthermore, HD 
affects emotional and behavioural aspects of 
the person (Snowden 1999). Symptoms usu-
ally appear between the ages of 35 and 45, 
but may set in at any age, and progress over a 
15-20 year period leading eventually to death. 
Medical genetics have established a 50% risk 
of passing on the mutated gene to any one 
child. The effect of medical treatment is still 
rather limited and there is, as yet, no cure. Par-
ticularly since the 1980’s a great many efforts 
have been vested in establishing the causes of 
HD. Following an almost classical mendelian 
pattern of autosomal dominant inheritance HD 
has attracted the attention of researchers from 
various branches of the natural sciences (Harp-
er 1996). In 1993, after an intensive ten-year 
search, the gene for HD was not just located 
to the short arm of chromosome 4, but also 
specifi ed as consisting of a prolonged CAG-
repeat. This was a milestone in the history of 
researching HD and it made genetic testing 
possible (Wexler 1996).
Key dimensions
Having introduced HD I shall now turn to the 
actual research project. Below I address the 
three main dimensions of my study and in 
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doing so I shall also address a specifi c ques-
tion posed by the evaluation committee for the 
Ph. D. dissertation, namely “how the results 
from the study matter as knowledge”. In the 
dissertation I suggest a rather critical stance 
towards scientifi c knowledge as the sole and 
solid foundation for acting and making deci-
sions in every day life. I propose the same criti-
cal stance towards the generation of insights 
in my own work. In this paper I would like to 
point out how discussions and insights may 
be generated from such a critical perspective 
and still be of use in the conduct of everyday 
life and professional practice concerned with 
HD and other hereditary diseases. The key 
dimensions are: 1) To approach the study of 
HD as a part of the concrete conditions for 
the personal conduct of everyday life and life 
trajectories for persons facing HD. 2) To con-
sider the importance of genetic knowledge and 
conceptions of risk for persons in HD families, 
for professional practice and for research into 
HD. 3) To address issues of the ethical rational-
ities in everyday life and professional practice 
and to look into the notion of the autonomous 
individual that seems inseparable from this 
discussion.
Methods and materials
The study was carried out as practice research 
in a critical psychological perspective (Holz-
kamp 1985/1994, Dreier 1993, Mørck 1995, 
Markard 1987/1991, Nissen 2000) and may also 
be described as an explorative fi eld study in the 
broad ethnographic sense. One way of gener-
ating empirical materials were participant ob-
servation in contexts such as the genetic coun-
selling clinic and the Department for Medical 
Genetics at Copenhagen Uni versity, the Danish 
National Huntington Association, and at vari-
ous research meetings over the duration of the 
project period. In these contexts I met persons 
involved with HD in many ways. They were 
persons at risk for HD, their children, relatives, 
friends, professionals and researchers. In addi-
tion, I conducted 18 semi-structured interviews. 
16 interviews were conducted with members of 
HD families and these interviews took place 
in participants homes whenever this was pos-
sible. 6 of these participants were at 50 % risk 
for HD meaning that they knew about HD in 
their family, that they were not ill at the time, 
and not tested. 10 participants had previously 
been tested. 6 were carriers of the HD gene but 
were not ill, as yet, and 4 did not carry the gene. 
Additionally, two partners took part in inter-
views and sometimes a child of the family was 
about. The remaining 2 interview participants 
were professionals involved with caring for HD 
families. As it may be noted the majority of the 
persons I have met during the study are not ill 
with HD. I chose not to ask persons who had 
symptoms of HD for interviews mainly because 
I could not be entirely certain of their informed 
consent due to the slowly progressing dementia 
involved in HD.
HD as part of the 
conduct of everyday life
The fi rst dimension that I would like to ad-
dress entails a discussion of what it means 
to approach the study of HD as a part of the 
concrete conditions for the personal conduct 
of everyday life. Most important, it means 
that persons and their everyday conduct is 
the primary locus of attention. HD is not an 
issue in and by itself but the issue is the role 
and importance of HD in the lives concerned. 
Thus the focus is not on disease and risk but 
on how members of HD families handle their 
entire life circumstances including aspects of 
illness and the awareness of risk. This focus 
is partly a consequence of my point of depar-
ture in theories of social practice (Lave 1997, 
Lave & Wenger 1997, Dreier 1997). From 
the perspective that persons participate in 
ongoing social practice across contexts HD 
must be viewed as potentially important in 
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everyday life to all family members (the ill, 
the unaffected, the tested, spouses, and other 
relatives). A further reason for focussing on 
everyday life rather than illness is that neu-
ropsychological research is already deep into 
understanding the disease and its progressing 
symptoms, developing diagnostic tools and 
various forms of treatment. HD as an ailment 
comes into my study in other ways. For one, 
through the perspectives on everyday life of 
the persons suffering from various stages of 
HD that I did meet in counselling and other 
contexts. A couple of these persons were very 
ill. Second, through the perspectives offered in 
interviews on the effects of illness in various 
relatives for other family members, for fam-
ily relations, and for the conduct of everyday 
life in general. Thus, in my materials illness 
fi gures as important in other ways than those 
directly related to having symptoms. The im-
portance of illness arises and is played out in 
ongoing everyday practice where other issues, 
other kinds of trouble, other preoccupations 
are also at stake in personal life trajectories 
as well as for relations.
John’s description of his relationship to his 
mother, who is ill with HD, refl ects a common 
experience of growing up with an ill parent. 
John remembers his mother as having always 
been ill. At fi rst she was diagnosed with ar-
thritis and stopped working when John was 
around 9 years old. Some years later she was 
completely “run down”, as John puts it. She 
would be going to bed late at night, getting up 
in the afternoon, walking and jerking around 
for hours not able to get herself organised or 
to have a decent conversation. John grieves the 
fact that when he grew old enough to have a 
proper discussion with her she was no long-
er capable.
Also important, the focus on everyday 
life made me re-think the main concepts I 
was confronted with when I fi rst engaged in 
the practices of the Department for Medical 
Genetics and the genetic counselling clinic at 
the University of Copenhagen. Those concepts 
were 1) hereditary disease, 2) persons at risk, 3) 
genetic testing. My approach to the fi eld made 
for different concepts to become central to my 
analysis and I fi nd the comparison illuminating: 
These concepts are 1) personal conduct of eve-
ryday life, 2) persons in HD families, 3) knowl-
edge and risk in everyday life. I have worked 
out and worked with these concepts from a 
theoretical standpoint within critical psychol-
ogy (Holzkamp 1985, Dreier 1993, Nissen 
1998), just as my general approach draws 
on the social sciences and thus come to point 
to a different set of issues in lives faced with 
HD than do the former concepts. The former 
concepts prevail not just in genetic research 
but also in clinical practice. They are concepts 
arising primarily from the perspectives of re-
searchers and professionals, and draw, at least 
in part, on genetic determinism as a frame for 
understanding HD. The latter concepts are 
worked out in order to grasp the perspectives 
of persons in HD families. They are intended 
to be useful by pointing to aspects of living 
with the awareness of HD that are commonly 
overlooked, on the basis of a personal perspec-
tive in concrete circumstances, where coming 
to an understanding with oneself of the situa-
tion is a gradual process. Such aspects of living 
everyday lives in a HD family were conveyed 
throughout my fi eldwork (Huniche 2002). My 
materials point to the importance of HD being 
similar but also variable even for persons who 
share similar circumstances. HD may have a 
negative or no particular effect in the personal 
lives of various family members. HD may oc-
cupy persons more or less according to their 
concrete life circumstances. This means that 
the personal signifi cance, or insignifi cance, of 
HD is rarely identical even where this might 
be expected. The importance of HD may vary 
greatly for persons within the same age group, 
who occupy a comparable position within the 
family, for example as the youngest sibling or 
as a partner, and for persons who have found 
40143_Outlines_2003   49 17/01/04, 14:08:09
50
Lotte Huniche •  Studying Genetic Risk in the Conduct of Everyday Life
out about HD at a similar point in life. Having 
said this, it is also clear that similar issues are 
at stake for persons in similar circumstances, 
that similar circumstances commonly produce 
similar kinds of trouble even if this is also spe-
cifi c to each person. This is one reason why 
for example partners or persons who are tested 
positive may fi nd it helpful to exchange their 
experiences. Barry and James are examples of 
persons who share certain circumstances. They 
are in their 30és, they have known about HD 
in their respective families for years, and they 
are both tested. They share common problems 
in everyday life arising from growing up with 
a parent who gradually turns into someone 
almost unrecognisable. They both talk about 
diffi cult visits to the nursing home, self-re-
proach for not being able to do more, their 
own awareness of risk for HD, going through 
the emotional turmoil of genetic testing, living 
with a test result and making decisions in the 
light of this. But there are important differences 
between their everyday lives.
Barry is living by himself and he is tested 
negative. So is his younger sibling. Their 
mother has suffered greatly because of her 
husbands’ illness, but she is doing the best she 
has in years. Contrary to what one might expect 
Barry is experiencing serious emotional prob-
lems. He goes through periods of confusion, 
sadness and lack of initiative, which prevents 
him from seeing friends, dating, and generally 
making his life work out. He spends much time 
alone or working long hours. Barry attributes 
his problems to the personal and familial tur-
moil he has been through partly because of the 
devastating importance of HD for his family. 
After his fathers diagnosis Barry settled his 
mind and reduced the insecure feeling of being 
at risk by arriving at the conclusion that he 
would probably get ill himself. His life was 
then turned upside down when he was tested 
negative. After the test he has felt obliged but 
unable to make something of his life.
In comparison, James is living with his girl-
friend and is tested positive. He has also been 
through some rough patches. He is a single 
child and he was still in his teens when his 
mother was diagnosed and his father died with 
a heart condition. The only other relative James 
has any contact with is of no support, much 
to James’ regret. Nevertheless, James enjoys 
a successful career and has recently bought 
a house with his girlfriend. They are settled 
with good friends and they are contemplating 
having a baby.
I would also like to mention Helen and 
Andrew who are partners and make up an 
example of sharing the same circumstances 
but from two different positions within the 
family. They describe fi nding out about HD 
in Helens’ family as having transformed their 
lives. The situation is particularly troublesome 
for Andrew who is not personally at risk. He 
is questioning his values and priorities in life 
to an extent where he can hardly function in 
everyday life. The choice to leave his former 
wife and children is shed in an entirely new 
light due to the unexpected threat of disease to 
Helen and to their young child. Andrew won-
ders whether this is a kind of “punishment” for 
breaking up his former family. Both Helen and 
Andrew continually scrutinise their priorities 
as career persons working long hours. The sud-
den death of a friend their own age has added 
to feelings of insecurity about how long they 
will each be allowed to live. Even so, Helen 
does not think of herself as equally devastated. 
She does not allow herself to become affected 
to an extent were she cannot live up to her 
obligations as a mother, wife, and a working 
person. Her main focus is to make things at 
home and between them work out. She is more 
concerned about the present situation, fi nding 
ways of hanging in there, than about the pos-
sible horrors of the future.
My materials also show that the importance 
of HD is not fi xed or static in any one personal 
life. Rather, the importance of HD varies and 
changes over time with changes in concrete 
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personal circumstances. Therefore I have also 
studied how, when and why HD becomes im-
portant, or not, in the accounts of personal life 
trajectories. Looking biographically at persons 
in HD families I point not only to changing per-
sonal importance of HD over time and across 
contexts, but also to how the trajectories of 
various family members, their ways of con-
ducting life, their understandings of the situ-
ation and their decision, may be, and often is, 
both differing and of great importance to other 
family members. For example, both Gale and 
Marianne talk about the changing importance 
of HD in their lives. Gale experienced a time 
of great frustration and preoccupation with HD 
just after her mother was diagnosed. But Gale 
is in her early 20’s and concerned with qualify-
ing for further education and enjoys a variety 
of spare time activities. Gradually over the fi rst 
year of fi nding out the negative importance of 
HD lessens and Gales’ concerns are centred 
round specifi c issues, i.e. telling her boyfriend, 
contacting her father. Marianne conveys how 
the conduct of her 3 siblings ended up having 
far-reaching consequences for her own life. 
Upon fi nding out about HD Marianne had 
settled for not having the test, but as her 3 
siblings were tested negative one by one, she 
experienced a gradual build-up of personal 
pressure to have the test. She felt that her odds 
for “being in the clear” were lessened by each 
of her siblings negative test results. In order 
to settle her own mind she decided to have 
the test and it turned out to be positive. Add-
ing to Mariannes’ frustration was the fact that 
she and her siblings had all agreed that no one 
would tell the others of their test results until 
everyone had been tested. Marianne appreci-
ates their motives for telling being the convey-
ance of “the good news” to their mother, but 
the broken promise fuels Mariannes’ feelings 
of injustice and has profound implications for 
their mutual relationships.
Knowledge and 
risk in everyday life
The second dimension entails a discussion 
of what genetic knowledge and conceptions 
of risk mean in the everyday lives of persons 
living in HD families. I found the discussion 
important as knowledge in medical genetics 
as well as notions of risk establish the most 
widely accepted associations between illness 
and everyday life with HD and so amount to 
the most powerful conceptions of HD in the 
fi eld. Furthermore, knowledge in medical 
genetics is widely staged as benefi cial and 
necessary in order to conduct life in a respon-
sible and acceptable manner. In the context 
of medical genetics knowledge becomes 
an almost unquestionable resource and risk 
calculation an integral part of weighing out 
alternative courses of action. Moral values, 
what is deemed right and wrong, gets tied to 
pursuing, possessing and utilising knowledge. 
Knowing and acting in moral accordance with 
one’s knowledge becomes the better way of 
conducting everyday life. In my work I ques-
tion such widespread notions of knowledge as 
universal, fi xed and true. On the other hand 
I do not subscribe to a social constructionist 
view of knowledge as a mere product of human 
thought and interaction. Rather, I argue that 
we need to understand how associations are 
made and maintained, or left to decay, between 
the bodily or material on the one hand, and 
the understandings, explanatory models and 
derived social practices on the other. I argue 
how various knowledge claims within medi-
cal genetics have evolved over time to become 
sound associations and how these associations 
are refl ected in everyday, activist and profes-
sional practices. Changes in knowledge claims 
make for changes not just in research but also 
in the concrete contexts of counselling, activ-
ism and everyday life. By refl ecting how these 
historically changing knowledge claims have 
been and still do become important to persons 
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in HD families in different ways we may get a 
better idea of the possibilities and limitations 
in everyday life that arise from them rather 
than putting our faith blindly into knowledge 
about genes and risk to provide solid and un-
problematic answers.
My materials indicate that knowledge about 
HD in the everyday lives of the concerned is 
more a question of fi nding out and handling the 
implications of HD than about knowing and 
applying facts. Facts may be a more or less 
central part of the gradual process of coming 
to an understanding with oneself and of making 
life work. Facts matter more or less in personal 
decision making processes. Knowledge of HD 
as part of the family heritage cannot be pinned 
down as of any specifi c kind or tied to any one 
event. The process of fi nding out and com-
ing to an understanding with oneself of facts, 
implications, and new circumstances arising 
from HD may last for years. Awareness of HD, 
just as various facts about inheritance, risk and 
medical technologies, is commonly in and out 
of focus throughout personal life trajectories. 
Concrete circumstances and consequences 
of HD change and so does the relevance of 
knowledge.
In my materials there are 3 characteristic 
ways of fi nding out about HD. 1) The sudden 
shock of fi nding out about HD when it comes 
“out of the blue” without prior warning. 2) The 
feeling that something is wrong without one 
knowing exactly what. Persons in HD fami-
lies may live with such awareness for years 
before fi nally tying a name to it. 3) HD may 
sometimes be an integral part of the personal 
life trajectory when persons have known and 
related to the diagnosis and its consequences 
all their lives. 
The “naming” or “labelling” of HD as a 
severe genetic disorder may serve as a relief 
just as it may sometimes be experienced as 
devastating news. Even though genetic know-
ledge and conceptions of risk are played out 
in various forms in everyday life, sometimes 
assuming an all-encompassing importance and 
sometimes hardly recognised at all, the overall 
impact of this kind of knowledge on how we 
perceive conduct and decision making in HD 
families is profound. I argue that personal con-
duct of everyday life with HD cannot but be 
reasoned on the basis of genetic knowledge in 
isolation nor does genetic knowledge provide 
unprolematic answers. However critical this 
may sound, it is not the insights from medical 
genetics per se that I am sceptical about, as 
much as the staging of this kind of knowledge 
as providing the right answers and the moral 
yardstick for proper conduct.
The ethical rationality 
of everyday life
As a third dimension I address the ethical 
rationality of everyday life and professional 
practice. I do so because of the present preoc-
cupation with ethics and morality in relation 
to genetic research, professional practice and 
concerning the everyday decisions in families 
with known hereditary conditions. From my 
materials it is clear that moral judgement is 
readily passed, just as it is common to evaluate 
ones own conduct and decisions with respect to 
moral soundness. Moral judgement about the 
conduct of everyday life is commonly argued 
with reference to knowledge about genetics 
and risk and with reference to courses of ac-
tion supported by technology, like for example 
presymptomatic or prenatal testing. Genetic 
knowledge is commonly referred to as the 
proper foundation for making the right deci-
sions and acting responsibly and thus the moral 
prompting is to know and to act. Implicitly, 
this amounts to the claim that the answer to 
responsible everyday decision making is to be 
found in knowledge and technology.
I suggest that this kind of moral prompt-
ing rests on the glorifi cation of genetic knowl-
edge and along with that the marginalisation 
of other kinds of knowledge. If knowledge is, 
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as I suggest, best understood as partial, local 
and changing then our confi dence in and use 
of genetic knowledge claims must take into 
consideration the limitations of its scope and 
usability. Further, I suggest that the modern no-
tion of the autonomous individual complicates 
choices and courses of action. The common 
notion of autonomy entails an understanding of 
the individual as educated, personally respon-
sible and capable of making the right moral 
choices (Taylor 1991). I argue that if we view 
personal conduct solely from the perspective 
of autonomy we cannot take into account im-
portant aspects of the social relatedness char-
acteristic of human lives. Autonomous moral-
ity is blind to the contradictions of living and 
choosing in social relations. Not seeking out 
information or making use of available tech-
nologies is hard to argue from the perspec-
tive of the autonomous individual but may be 
staged as morally sound if consequences for 
entire family network are considered.
I also suggest that a particular responsibil-
ity rests with professionals in genetic counsel-
ling and other areas of assisting persons with 
hereditary diseases to take into account the 
limitations of informed and technology sup-
ported courses of action. For quite a number 
of persons in my materials genetic knowledge 
is useful and sometimes relieving, but it is also 
problematic and does not always represent an 
easy way of fi xing a complex life situation. 
Knowing does not necessarily make decisions 
any easier, but surely complicates matters with 
respect to making moral judgements. Making 
use of genetic technologies has its drawbacks 
that may undermine the moral solidity of the 
chosen course of action. For example, a couple 
might want to make sure that their baby is not 
at risk for HD by means of pre-natal genetic 
testing. This attempt at acting responsibly is 
somewhat modifi ed by the risk of having to 
abort an affected foetus. It is not possible to as-
certain whether an affected foetus is to become 
ill at a young age or live to be eighty before 
symptoms occur. Therefore the choice of abor-
tion is not straightforward. Furthermore, in my 
materials everyday conduct and decisions are 
argued with reference to notions of responsi-
bility, duty, right, or consequences, and equal 
arguments are brought into play even if they 
lead to opposite effects. For example the notion 
of responsible parenthood may lead both to 
having and not having a child with risk for HD 
if for example termination is deemed immoral. 
Differing circumstances make for different pri-
orities and diverse evaluations of what matters 
make for differing courses of action.
Concluding remarks
I have fi nally arrived at drawing up the con-
cluding remarks to the question of “how the 
results from the study matter as knowledge”. 
It matters as knowledge about the possibili-
ties and limitations of knowledge and the as-
sociated technologies within medical genetics. 
The notion of rationality in the enlightenment 
tradition is present in most, if not all, contem-
porary claims to knowledge, but rationality in 
this sense is but one relevant aspect of know-
ledge in ongoing social practice. I conceive of 
genetic knowledge as situated and practiced in 
concrete social contexts. Associations between 
the material on one hand and understandings 
and practices on the other are continually ne-
gotiated and changing. A staggering example is 
how the number of CAG-repeats in the genetic 
makeup of a person at risk for HD is associated 
with age at onset of symptoms and risk of inher-
itance and how this association is continually 
revised and refi ned. Equally, morality and eth-
ics are produced historically and culturally as 
values and imperatives that become part of the 
circumstances in which persons involved with 
hereditary disease conduct their everyday lives, 
make and carry out decisions. These values and 
imperatives are important with respect to how 
such persons may establish themselves and how 
they come to be viewed by others as responsible 
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and accountable or not. Furthermore, values and 
imperatives are part of establishing and devel-
oping research, technology and professional 
practice within medical genetics and should 
be considered as such. I argue that no one, 
neither Colin who is described as repressing 
the fact that he is at risk, David and Beth who 
want a child with no risk, although David does 
not want a genetic test himself, nor the stances 
and practices of professional counsellors and 
researchers are best helped by any formulation 
of a general rule or by way of calculating happi-
ness against suffering in a traditional utilitarian 
sense. My stance towards morality in conduct 
of everyday life and professional practice draw 
on the Aristotelian tradition of weighing out 
and refl ecting circumstances and alternative 
courses of action in practice. This also means 
that individual autonomy has to be situated in 
the larger communities. Drawing on the work 
of philosophers like Uffe Juul Jensen (1996) 
and Mariana Valverde (2002) I suggest ethics 
to be a question of deciding on certain principles 
to serve as a sounding board when considering 
concrete ways of acting in social practice. A 
principle like “the responsibility for the week 
and the vulnerable” (Jensen 1995) is thus a 
stance towards human relations and societal 
makeup, but it is also a political statement that 
conveys the kind of practical consequences of 
a moral argument that one wants to support. If 
morality is not a question of legitimising the use 
of power but rather a defence and a manifesta-
tion against oppression then we must consider 
how genetic knowledge and medical technolo-
gies are used as tools in this struggle.
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